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Abstract k-Anonymity by microaggregation is one of the
most commonly used anonymization techniques. This suc-
cess is owe to the achievement of a worth of interest trade-
off between information loss and identity disclosure risk.
However, this method may have some drawbacks. On the
disclosure limitation side, there is a lack of protection against
attribute disclosure. On the data utility side, dealing with a
real datasets is a challenging task to achieve. Indeed, the lat-
ter are characterized by their large number of attributes and
the presence of noisy data, such that outliers or, even, data
with missing values. Generating an anonymous individual
data useful for data mining tasks, while decreasing the influ-
ence of noisy data is a compelling task to achieve.
In this paper, we introduce a new microaggregation method,
called HM-PFSOM, based on fuzzy possibilistic clustering.
Our proposed method operates through an hybrid manner.
This means that the anonymization process is applied per
block of similar data. Thus, we can help to decrease the in-
formation loss during the anonymization process. The HM-
PFSOM approach proposes to study the distribution of con-
fidential attributes within each sub-dataset. Then, according
to the latter distribution, the privacy parameter k is deter-
mined, in such a way to preserve the diversity of confiden-
tial attributes within the anonymized microdata. This allows
to decrease the disclosure risk of confidential information.
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1 Introduction
The ever growing privacy concern has been a major obstacle
for individual data analysis. In fact, many situations require
that governmental, public and private organizations share
and release their specific data (Chui et al 2014). These latter,
generally, reflect our everyday life activities, e.g. credit card
transactions, activities on the web, phone calls, widespread
diseases, etc. Publishing and releasing such type of data can
provide benefits to researchers and decision makers, owe
to their flexibility and availability of detailed information
(Teplitzky 2014). For example, healthcare organizations col-
lect and analyze medical data for the discovery of new drugs
and therapies (Rider and Chawla 2013). Retail companies
need information about customers, in order to identify cus-
tomer purchases behaviours, discover customer shopping pat-
terns and trends, and thus improve the quality of customer
services (Peersman 2014). Banks and financial institutions
also collect financial data to predict credit fraud, evaluate
risk and perform trend analysis (Bennardo et al 2015). As for
telecommunication companies, they maintain a great deal of
call detail data, which describe the calls that traverse telecom-
munication networks (Chittaranjan et al 2013). Such data
can be useful to identify vulnerabilities of networks. Social
networks are undoubtedly the most extreme example of data
valorisation. The deal is to provide users a free social me-
dia platform to entertain, in return collect all kinds of in-
formation describing the users’ relationships, interests, apps
in use, and also religion or political opinions (Johnson et al
2012). Such information are used to sell advertising and in-
sights based on their profiles. The Facebook-Cambridge An-
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alytica data scandal is the prime example of how personal
data could be disclosed, where the collection of personally
identifiable information of up to 87 million Facebook users
was allegedly used to attempt to influence voter opinion on
behalf of politicians who hired them (Solon 2018).
However, individual data may contain confidential infor-
mation. Thus, collecting, analyzing and sharing such data,
raises threat to individual privacy. Data de-identification, i.e.
hiding explicit identifiers, is considered of paramount im-
portance to avoid sensitive information from being disclosed.
Such process involves removing any information which is
able to uniquely identify an individual, e.g. name, SSN, etc
(Garfinkel 2015). Nevertheless, the latter process could not
guarantee efficient security. Indeed, it was shown that is pos-
sible to manipulate de-identified datasets and recover per-
sonal information, through data linkage techniques (Ohm
2010). It is worth mentioning that disclosure risk can be
classified into two categories, namely (Hundepool et al 2012):
– Identity disclosure: The intruder is able to determine the
real identity of individual corresponding to a record in
the published microdata. Thus, the intruder can associate
the confidential information to the re-identified data sub-
ject.
– Attribute disclosure: Even if identity disclosure does not
happen, it may be possible for an intruder to infer some
information for a specific individual based on the pub-
lished microdata.
Therefore, a large number of Privacy-Preserving Data
Mining (PPDM) methods have been proposed aiming at en-
suring privacy of the respondents, while preserving the sta-
tistical utility of the original data (Aggarwal and Yu 2008).
The basic idea of this research area is to modify the col-
lected data, subject to be released, in such a way to perform
effectively analyses and knowledge discovery tasks with-
out compromising the security of sensitive information con-
tained in the data. Such process leads to reduce the granu-
larity of information, which can cause a loss of data effec-
tiveness. Thus, finding a trade-off between the two conflict-
ing principles, i.e. privacy and data utility, is of the utmost
importance in PPDM process. Microaggregation (Domingo-
Ferrer 2008), is a widely accepted PPDM method for data
anonymization. The principle is to de-associate the relation-
ship between the identity of data subjects and their confi-
dential information. Given a security parameter k, the ba-
sic idea of microaggregation is to split a dataset into small
groups, of size at least k. Then, the values of the original
data are replaced by those of the cluster’s centroid to which
they belong to. Thereby, any data is indistinguishable among
other (k− 1) data. The resulting anonymous dataset fulfils
the k-anonymity model (Sweeney 2002). Thereby, privacy is
ensured by preventing record linkage. Meanwhile, data util-
ity is maintained by gathering records that share the same
characteristics. However, generating an optimal k-partition
while maintaining the homogeneity of data within a fixed
size group has been shown a NP-hard problem (Oganian and
Domingo-Ferrer 2001). So, the only practical microaggrega-
tion methods are based on heuristics. Generally, these meth-
ods rely on refinement steps, during the partitioning process,
which consists in merging or splitting the obtained fixed
size groups. However, in real datasets the poor homogene-
ity within the generated partition can be significant. Thus,
its refinement could be costly and does not necessarily con-
verge to the optimal partition. Besides, all microaggregation
methods have focused on decreasing the information loss,
while maintaining the constraint of the group’s size. As con-
sequence, the modified dataset can be exposed to attribute
linkage. In fact, k-Anonymity can create groups that leak in-
formation due to lack of diversity in the sensitive attribute
(Machanavajjhala et al 2007).
This study aims to deal with these shortcomings, by propos-
ing a new algorithm called HM-PFSOM. The proposed algo-
rithm relies on the following assumptions:
– Preventing the identity disclosure risk by requiring that
the generated partition should fulfil the k-anonymity prop-
erty.
– Preventing the attribute disclosure by ensuring the di-
versity of confidential attributes within each fixed size
group of the generated partition.
– Maintaining the data utility of the anonymous micro-
data by increasing the homogeneity within the fixed size
groups, i.e. k-partition.
In order to meet the latter requirements, the HM-PFSOM
algorithm operates in an hybrid manner, i.e. per block of
data. Indeed, to avoid the risk of gathering data with dis-
similar quasi-identifiers in a same group, the HM-PFSOM
algorithm splits the microdata into disjoint sub-microdata,
through a fuzzy clustering algorithm. The clustering process
is applied according to the quasi-identifiers, in order to apply
the microaggregation process independently on each sub-
microdata, i.e. group of data having similar quasi-identifiers.
Unlike the standard microaggregation methods, the HM-
PFSOM algorithm don’t require a predefined privacy param-
eter k, fixed arbitrary, to build the k-anonymous microdata.
It proposes to study the distribution of confidential attributes
within each sub-microdata. Then, according to the latter dis-
tribution, the parameter k is determined, in such a way to
preserve the diversity of confidential attributes within the
anonymized microdata.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the main PPDM approaches, in particular microaggregation
methods. Section 3 introduces the novel HM-PFSOM al-
gorithm for Hybrid Microaggregation by using the PFSOM
clustering method. Finally, section 4 evaluates the perfor-
mance of the proposed approach, through experiments car-
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ried out on real-life datasets. Finally, Section 5 sketches our
contributions and points out avenues of future work
2 Related work and motivation
In this section we present a succinct introduction to data
anonymization and sanitization techniques. We focus in par-
ticular on microaggregation model, which is one of the most
popular, studied and used PPDM methods. A discussion is
also presented, in order to situate our contribution with re-
spect to the reviewed ones of the literature.
2.1 Data anonymization and sanitization techniques
Let X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} be a de-identified dataset, also called
microdata, subject to be released. Each input data xi ∈ X is
a set of m attributes A = {a1,a2, . . . ,am}, and xi [a j] denotes
the value of attribute a j of the data xi. We assume that X is
a subset of some larger population Ω where each input data
represents an individual. The set of attributes A is composed
primarily by (Sweeney 2002):
– Quasi-identifiers Qid = {qid1,qid2, . . . ,qidp}, which are
a non-sensitive attributes. Nevertheless, if the latter are
linked with external information they can uniquely iden-
tify at least one individual.
– Confidential attributes S = {s1,s2, . . . ,sq}, also called
sensitive attributes, which their values for any particu-
lar individual must be kept secret from users who have
no direct access to the original data;
Thus, the set of attributes A can be represented by Qid ∪ S,
i.e. A = {qid1,qid2, . . . ,qidp} ∪ {s1,s2, . . . ,sq}, where p+
q = m.
Perturbation of data is a very easy and effective method
for protecting the sensitive information of individual data
from unauthorised users or hackers. These methods allow
the release of the entire microdata, although by masking
the sensitive information (Liu et al 2008). This requires to
generate a set of random values, which will be used sub-
sequently to hide sensitive information of the released data
(Kargupta et al 2005). To maintain privacy and data utility,
data perturbation methods aim to replace the original values
of data with some artificial values, while maintaining their
statistical properties. As the perturbed data records does not
match with the original ones, the attacker cannot recover the
sensitive information from the perturbed data.
The most widely used techniques, in data perturbation meth-
ods, are additive noise and multiplicative stochastic noise
(Agrawal and Srikant 2000)(Chen and Liu 2008)(Ciriani et al
2007) (Du and Zhan 2003)(Evfimievski et al 2002)(Mivule
2013). To maintain the effectiveness of data, the generated
random values require to comply with the distribution of the
original ones. Thus, the distribution of each data dimension
is reconstructed independently. This means that any distri-
bution based data mining algorithm works under an implicit
assumption to treat each dimension independently (Matwin
2013). However, in many cases, a lot of relevant information
for data mining algorithms is hidden in inter-attribute corre-
lations.
Microaggregation technique (Domingo-Ferrer 2008) relaxes
the constraint of hiding sensitive attributes with random val-
ues. Its principle consists in de-associating the relationship
between quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes of indi-
vidual records. Given a security parameter k, the basic idea
of microaggregation is to split a dataset into small groups,
of size at least k. Then, the quasi-identifiers of the origi-
nal data are replaced with those of the cluster’s centroid to
which they belongs to. Thereby, any data is indistinguish-
able among other (k− 1) data. The resulting anonymous
dataset fulfils the k-anonymity model (Sweeney 2002). Thus,
privacy is ensured by preventing record linkage. Meanwhile,
data utility is maintained by gathering records sharing the
same characteristics of quasi-identifiers.
2.2 The k-anonymous microaggregation model
Normally, microaggregation gathers the closest data in the
same fixed size group, in such a way that the respective
distances between the data vectors and the corresponding
centroids is as small as possible. Thus, the microaggrega-
tion generates a protected microdata X ′ that is similar to
the original one, but where data in X ′ are slightly different
from those of X . The optimal k-partition is defined as that
it maximizes the within-group homogeneity. The higher the
within-group homogeneity, the lower the information loss is.
However, finding the optimal cluster configuration has been
shown to be a NP-hard problem (Oganian and Domingo-
Ferrer 2001). This issue has grasped the interest of the liter-
ature and a wealthy number of methods exist.
According to data dimensionality, microaggregation meth-
ods can be split into two categories, namely, univariate and
multivariate approaches. The k-partitioning mechanism is
the same in all such methods: first, data vectors are sorted in
ascending or descending order according to some criterion.
Then, groups of successive k vectors are combined. Inside
each group, the effect for each variable is to replace the k
values taken by the variable with their average. If the total
number of data vectors n is not a multiple of k, the last group
will contain more than k data vectors.
2.2.1 Univariate microaggregation methods
Univariate microaggregation performs a straightforward one-
dimensional sorting. To this end, projected methods, also
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called single axis, are used to summarize the p quasi-identifiers
of each data vector into a single value (Nin and Torra 2009).
The most commonly used methods are Principal Compo-
nents Analysis and the sum of Zscores (Nin et al 2008)(Templ
2008). To do so, all attributes are firstly standardized and, for
each data vector, the standardized values are added. Vectors
are subsequently sorted, w.r.t. the scores of the first principal
component or by their sum of z-scores. This approach has
been shown to be very useful with highly correlated data,
i.e., the higher the correlation is, the lower the information
loss (Nin et al 2008). However, in real-life datasets, data are
not necessarily so highly correlated, which makes these ap-
proaches so ineffective.
Another alternative for univariate microaggregation is to ap-
ply an anonymization process to each variable independently,
i.e. data vectors are sorted by the first variable, then groups
of k successive values of the first variable are formed and,
inside each group, values are replaced by the group aver-
age. A similar procedure is repeated for the remainder of
variables. This method is referred to as individual sorting
(Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz 2002). Even though, this
method usually maintains the data utility, it has a higher dis-
closure risk, i.e. no k-anonymity will be achieved in general.
Indeed, by just taking into account the first variable, the k
data standing in the same cluster might be assigned to dif-
ferent clusters when all the other variables are considered.
2.2.2 Multivariate microaggregation methods
When the multivariate data are microaggregated without pro-
jecting them in one-dimension, this is referred to as a multi-
variate microaggregation. The Maximum Distance to Aver-
age Vector (MDAV) algorithm (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra
2005) is the most used for microaggregartion, which oper-
ates through an iterative process. Its principle involves com-
puting the centroid of the quasi-identifiers of all input data.
The distance of the data to the obtained centroid is used
as a sorting criteria. To achieve that, two extreme data, xr
and xd , relative to the centroid are extracted. Where xr is
the most distant data vector to the centroid, and xd is the
most distant data vector to xr. Then, two groups are formed
with size k around xr and xd , respectively. Such process is
repeated until all input data vectors of the original micro-
data are partitioned. Then, the MDAV algorithm generates
a partition of fixed size groups having a same cardinality,
which is equal to k. Note that, if the number of input data
is not divisible by k, the cardinality of one group, gener-
ally the last one, ranges between k and 2k−1. However, the
obtained partition of the MDAV algorithm may lack flexibil-
ity for adapting the group size constraint to the distribution
of the data vectors (Domigo-Ferrer et al 2006). Several mi-
croaggregation methods have been proposed to improve the
homogeneity within the fixed size groups obtained by the
MDAV algorithm (Chang et al 2007) (Domigo-Ferrer et al
2006) (Domingo-Ferrer and U´rsula Gonza´lez-Nicola´s 2010)
(Lin et al 2010) (Martı´nez-Balleste´ et al 2007) (Solanas et al
2012). Generally these methods add further steps, called re-
finement steps, which consists in merging or splitting the
obtained fixed size groups. Thus, yielding a more freedom
partition, having groups with different cardinality varying
between k and 2k−1.
However, in real datasets the poor homogeneity within the
generated partition can be significant. So, its refinement could
be costly and does not necessarily converge to the optimal
partition. Besides, all microaggregation methods have fo-
cused on the constraint of homogeneity of the k-partition to
reduce the information loss. As consequence, the modified
dataset can be exposed to an attribute disclosure risk.
2.3 Discussion & Motivation
In our opinion, the major weakness of micoaggregation meth-
ods consists in applying the k-partitioning process without
studying the distribution of the input data and their corre-
lation. We are convinced that, if there is a step to add, in
order to converge to the optimal k-partition, it should be ap-
plied before the partitioning process. This step should ana-
lyze the similarity between the quasi-identifiers of the input
data, in order to decide which data should be gathered in a
same group. Therewith, we are of the view that to prevent
against identity disclosure, the parameter k should be fixed
according to the distribution of sensitive information, in or-
der to ensure that the k-anonymous records fulfil a diversity
of sensitive information and so prevent attribute disclosure.
To meet these issues, we propose a new method, called HM-
PFSOM, for hybrid microaggregation, by using PFSOM algo-
rithm for fuzzy possibilistic clustering (Abidi and Ben Yahia
2013). The main idea of the HM-PFSOM algorithm consists
in splitting the original dataset into disjoint sub-datasets, in
such a way that data within the same sub-dataset must be
similar to some extend. In addition, they should be dissim-
ilar to those data in other sub-datasets. Such process en-
ables to avoid the refinement phases used to fine tune the
k-anonymous partition, since the partitioning process is per-
formed only on similar data. Indeed, the HM-PFSOM al-
gorithm applies the k-partitioning process independently on
each sub-dataset.
On privacy side, the HM-PFSOM algorithm proposes to study
the distribution of confidential attributes within each sub-
dataset. Then, according to the latter distribution, the pri-
vacy parameter k is determined, in such a way to maintain
the diversity of confidential attributes within the anonymous
microdata.
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3 Data anonymisation by hybrid microaggregation
In the following, we introduce a new method, called HM-
PFSOM, to balance between the above conflicting issues, in
order to achieve the tedious optimal partition used to gener-
ate an anonymous microdata.
3.1 General principle of the hybrid microaggregation
We propose a new microaggregation method, called hybrid
microaggregation, for privacy-preserving data mining. The
proposed method, sketched in Algorithm 1, follows the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Splitting step: This step aims to split the original micro-
data into disjoint sub-microdata.
2. Partitioning step: This step generates a fixed size parti-
tion from each sub-microdata.
3. Merging step: In this step, the generated fixed size parti-
tions are used to train a k-anonymous microdata.
Algorithm 1: The general principle of the hybrid mi-
croaggregation method
Input: X : The original microdata
Output: X ′ : The anonymous microdata
Begin1
Split the microdata X into c disjoint sub-microdata2
X = Xid1∪Xid2∪ . . .∪Xidc.3
Foreach sub-microdata Xid j ∈ {Xid1,Xid2, . . . ,Xidc},4
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,c} do
X ′j ← Partitioning process(Xid j)5
X ′ = X ′1∪X ′2∪ . . .∪X ′c6
End7
The hybrid microaggregation integrates an additional step
which consists in discovering the distribution of the quasi-
identifiers of all input data. This step aims to decide which
data that can not belong to a same fixed-size group. Doing
so, the hybrid microaggregation starts by splitting the origi-
nal microdata X into a set of disjoint sub-microdata, i.e. X =
{X1,X2, . . . ,Xc}, where each sub-microdata gathers similar
data. Then, an adaptive partitioning process is applied inde-
pendently on each sub-microdata Xi, i = {1, . . . ,c}, to train
a ki-partition. Afterward, the anonymous microdata is ob-
tained from the generated ki-partition, i = {1, . . . ,c}.
The adaptive partitioning process should maintain the diver-
sity of confidential attributes within each fixed size group.
The latter constraint is paramount importance in the sake of
avoiding attribute disclosure risk. To better understand such
constraint, let Xmicro, given in Table 1, be an original micro-
data. Each input data xi ∈ Xmicro is characterized by a set
of two-dimensional quasi-identifiers, i.e. ZIP code and Age,
and one confidential attribute, i.e. Disease.
Table 2 shows an example of a k-anonymous microdata
Table 1: A microdata sample Xmicro
ZIP code Age Disease
x1 2025 28 Heart Disease
x2 2022 29 Heart Disease
x3 2022 25 Viral Infection
x4 2020 24 Viral Infection
x5 1012 50 Cancer
x6 1012 55 Heart Disease
x7 1013 47 Viral Infection
x8 1013 49 Viral Infection
x9 1023 31 Cancer
x10 1022 34 Cancer
x11 1021 35 Cancer
x12 1021 37 Cancer
Table 2: The 4-anonymous microdata of Xmicro
ZIP code Age Disease
G1
x1 2022 27 Heart Disease
x2 2022 27 Heart Disease
x3 2022 27 Viral Infection
x4 2022 27 Viral Infection
G2
x5 1012 50 Cancer
x6 1012 50 Heart Disease
x7 1012 50 Viral Infection
x8 1012 50 Viral Infection
G3
x9 1021 34 Cancer
x10 1021 34 Cancer
x11 1021 34 Cancer
x12 1021 34 Cancer
generated from the original microdata Xmicro, via a standard
microaggregation technique, where the privacy parameter k
is set to 3. Note that, the microaggregation is applied in
such a way that the obtained anonymous microdata fulfils
the k-anonymity property. For any combination of values of
quasi-identifiers in the released microdata, there are at least
3 records sharing that combination of values. The fixed size
partition is obtained such that each 3 similar data are gath-
ered in same group. The similarity is measured on the basis
of the quasi-identifiers attributes.
However, an anonymous microdata, as given in Table 2, can
be sensitive to attribute linkage attack, i.e. an intruder can
discover the confidential information of a given individual.
Namely, suppose that the intruder has some knowledge about
an individual, for example he is aged 35 years old and he
lives in a city where its ZIP code is 1022. Thus, by link-
ing these information with the 3-anonymous microdata, the
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intruder can conclude that the individual in question corre-
sponds to one of the four records having a cancer disease.
To prevent such disclosure, it would be better to ensure, dur-
ing the partitioning process, the diversity of confidential at-
tributes within each fixed size group, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: The optimal 3-partition of Xmicro
ZIP code Age Disease
G1
x6 1012 55 Heart Disease
x5 1012 50 Cancer
x8 1013 49 Viral Infection
G2
x7 1013 47 Viral Infection
x12 1021 37 Cancer
x10 1022 34 Cancer
x2 2022 29 Heart Disease
G3
x11 1021 35 Cancer
x1 2025 28 Heart Disease
x3 2022 25 Viral Infection
x4 2020 24 Viral Infection
x9 1023 31 Cancer
In the following, we present in detail the major steps of
the proposed HM-PFSOM algorithm for hybrid microaggre-
gation.
3.2 The HM-PFSOM algorithm for hybrid
microaggregation
The HM-PFSOM is a new algorithm for hybrid microaggre-
gation aiming to protect microdata from individual identi-
fication, that could be identity or attribute disclosure risk.
The HM-PFSOM algorithm proceeds by extracting the op-
timal partition of a given microdata, which will be used to
generate the k-anonymous microdata. Thus, the obtained mi-
crodata can avoid, or at least decrease, the identity disclo-
sure risk. However, the main originality of the HM-PFSOM
algorithm is that it redefines the process of extracting the k-
partition, by supposing that the cardinality k of each group
should not be fixed arbitrary, but it should retain the diver-
sity of confidential attributes.
The pseudo-code of the HM-PFSOM algorithm is sketched
by Algorithm 2.
The HM-PFSOM algorithm starts by splitting the origi-
nal microdata into disjoint sub-microdata (line 2), in such a
way that data sharing similar characteristic of quasi-identifiers
are gathered in the same sub-microdata. To do so, the HM-
PFSOM algorithm, relies on fuzzy possibilistic clustering pro-
cess (Abidi and Ben Yahia 2013). Thereafter, the partition-
ing process of the microaggregation can be applied indepen-
dently on each sub-microdata (lines 4− 17). Accordingly,
Algorithm 2: The HM-PFSOM algorithm
Input:
– X : The original microdata
– k : Privacy parameter
Output: X ′ : The anonymous microdata
Begin1
Split the microdata X into c disjoint sub-microdata,2
according to the quasi-identifiers, i.e.
X = Xid1∪Xid2∪ . . .∪Xidc.
/* Apply an hybrid microaggregation process */3
Foreach sub-microdata Xid j ∈ {Xid1,Xid2, . . . ,Xidc},4
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,c} do
Let x¯id( j) be the cluster centers of the sub-microdata5
Xid j .
Split the sub-microdata Xid j into cs j disjoint clusters,6
according to the confidential attributes.
Let Cs = {C1,C2, . . . ,Ccs j} be the set of obtained7
clusters.
While |Ci| ≥ k,∀Ci ∈Cs do8
Extract xr the most distant record to x¯id( j).9
/* Form a fixed size group around xr*/10
Let Cr be the cluster to which belong the data11
vector xr .
Extract from the cluster Cr the (k−1) closest12
data vector to xr
Remove the extracted data vector from Cr13
Foreach Ci ∈Cs−{Cr} do14
Extract the k closest data vector to xr15
Remove the extracted data vector from Ci16
Assign the remaining data to their nearest group.17
/* Generate an anonymous sub-microdata X ′j */18
Within each formed group, replace the values of each19
quasi-identifier attribute with the average value of the
attribute over the group.
X ′ = X ′1∪X ′2∪ . . .∪X ′c20
End21
the risk of gathering dissimilar data in a same group will be
eliminated. Thus, the HM-PFSOM algorithm avoids the re-
finement steps used to improve the homogeneity of the final
k-partition.
To ensure the diversity of confidential attributes within
the k-partition, the HM-PFSOM algorithm studies the distri-
bution of confidential attributes within each sub-microdata
Xid j ⊂X , ∀ j∈{1, . . . ,c}. Then, the fixed size groups should
be generated in such a way to fulfil the latter distribution. To
achieve such purpose, the HM-PFSOM algorithm extracts at
first, from each sub-microdata Xid j, the cs j disjoint clusters
of confidential attributes (line 6). The latter clusters are used
thereafter for generating fixed size groups. Unlike the stan-
dard microaggregation methods, the HM-PFSOM algorithm
imposes a condition on the group size. Each group should
gather at least cs j data vectors belonging to different clus-
ters of confidential attributes. To do so, the data vectors of
Xid j are distributed into cs j disjoint groups, according to
their confidential attributes. These data should be close as
possible in terms of quasi-identifiers and distant in terms of
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confidential attributes. In order to respond to such constraint
the HM-PFSOM applies an adaptive partitioning process. It
computes at first the center of the sub-microdata, noted by
x¯id( j) (line 5). Then, a data vector xr is extracted. The lat-
ter corresponds to the most distant data to the centroid x¯id( j)
(line 9). Let Cr be the cluster to which xr belongs. The HM-
PFSOM algorithm selects firstly the k− 1 closest data vec-
tors from the clusters Cr (line 12). Then, from each cluster
Ci, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,r−1,r+1, . . . ,cs}, the k closest data vector
to xr are either extracted (lines 14−16). Such process is re-
peated until all fixed size groups, i.e. of cardinality k× cs j,
are formed.
The remaining data are simply assigned to their closest group.
Thereby, we can guarantee the diversity of sensitive attributes
within each group.
Once the input data of the sub-microdata Xid j are parti-
tioned into groups, of cardinality at least k× cs, the HM-
PFSOM algorithm generates the anonymous sub-microdata
X ′j, by replacing the data vectors by the centroid to which
belong to (line 19).
The final anonymous microdata X ′ is considered as the union
of the anonymous sub-microdata (line 20).
In the following, we propose to use an illustrative exam-
ple to highlight the principle of the k-partitioning process,
adopted by the HM-PFSOM algorithm.
Illustrative example
Let Xsub−micro, given in Table 4, be a sub-microdata of a
given original microdata. Each input data xi ∈Xsub−micro con-
tains one confidential attribute, i.e. Salary.
Table 4: Example of sub-microdata Xsub−micro generated
from a given microdata
xi ZIP code Age Salary
x1 1011 22 500
x2 1007 22 550
x3 1012 23 600
x4 1009 25 1600
x5 1010 28 1500
x6 1011 29 1800
x7 1013 31 2900
x8 1010 32 3200
x9 1008 32 3600
x10 1010 29 1650
x11 1009 26 1550
x12 1011 27 1700
x13 1008 33 3800
Before extracting the fixed size groups, the HM-PFSOM al-
gorithm starts by applying a clustering process in order to
study the distribution of the confidential attribute values.
We note that the confidential attribute of the input data are
distributed into 3 clusters, which are respectively illustrated
in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Indeed, the set of data {x1,x2,x3} are
characterized by a salary varying between 500 and 600, i.e.
a low salary values. While the salary attribute of the second
set of data vectors {x4,x5,x6,x10,x11,x12} ranges between
1500 and 1800, i.e. a middle salary values. Whereas the third
set of data {x7,x8,x9,x13} is characterized by high values of
salary, varying between 2900 and 3800.
Table 5: Cluster 1: Data vectors with low salary
xi ZIP code Age Salary
x1 1011 22 500
x2 1007 22 550
x3 1012 23 600
Table 6: Cluster 2: Data vectors with middle salary
xi ZIP code Age Salary
x4 1009 25 1600
x5 1010 28 1500
x6 1011 29 1800
x10 1010 29 1650
x11 1009 26 1550
x12 1011 27 1700
Table 7: Cluster 3: Data vectors with high salary
xi ZIP code Age Salary
x7 1013 31 2900
x8 1010 32 3200
x9 1008 32 3600
x13 1008 33 3800
To maintain the latter distribution of the confidential at-
tribute, the HM-PFSOM algorithm builds the fixed size groups
according to the obtained clusters, by requiring that each
group should contain at least 3 dissimilar confidential at-
tribute values. For example, the first fixed size groups G1
gathers 3 data, namely x1, x8, x10 and x12, belonging to dif-
ferent clusters. Indeed, the data vector x1 has a low salary
value, while the data vectors x10 and x12 are characterized,
by a middle salary. Whereas, the data x8 has a high salary.
The same principle is applied to the other groups, i.e. G2
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and G3. Thus, the final 3-partition should matches to the one
given in Table 4.
Table 8: The optimal 3-partition of the sub-microdata
Xsub−micro
xi ZIP code Age Salary
G1
x1 1011 22 500
x12 1011 27 1700
x8 1010 32 3200
x10 1010 29 1650
G2
x2 1007 22 550
x4 1009 25 1600
x9 1008 32 3600
x11 1009 26 1550
G3
x3 1012 23 600
x5 1010 28 1500
x7 1013 31 2900
x6 1011 29 1800
x13 1008 33 3800
To achieve such partition, we propose to fix at first the num-
ber of groups, denoted by kg. Then, the data within each
cluster are partitioned into the kg groups. In our example,
the number of groups is set equal to 3, and the data of the
clusters low, middle and high salary are distributed into the
3 groups.
3.3 Fuzzy possibilistic clustering for hybrid
microaggregation
The main challenge of the HM-PFSOM algorithm is to find
the suitable set of the sub-microdata contained in the origi-
nal microdata X , i.e. X = {Xid1,Xid2, . . . ,Xidc}. Moreover,
for each sub-microdata, it is important to find out its groups
of confidential attributes and rightly assess their centres even
in noisy surroundings. Clustering is a useful means to achieve
such important target. Indeed, clustering aims to discover
the unrevealed relationships between data, by splitting a dataset
into disjoint clusters. Where each cluster gathers similar data,
and dissimilar to those data in other clusters.
In this respect, we have proposed in a previous work a fuzzy
possibilistic clustering algorithm, called Possibilistic Fuzzy
Self Organising Map (PFSOM) (Abidi and Ben Yahia 2013),
able to split a given dataset into c disjoint clusters, via a
multi-level process. Where c corresponds to the optimal num-
ber of clusters contained in a dataset (Abidi et al 2012). Each
level aims to group similar outputs resulting from the level
below. Doing so, the first level is used to form an initial parti-
tion of the dataset X , by training the data into an initial clus-
ters. The latter clusters are fine-tuned through a hierarchical
levels. The role of each level is to build a partition of the
outputs of the level below. Such a process produces a hier-
archical structure composed of several partitions. To extract
the best one, the PFSOM algorithm integrates, during the
multi-level process, a validity index, called a Partition Coef-
ficient and Exponential Separation (PCAES) index (Wu and
Yang 2005). At each level, the algorithm assesses the quality
of the partition, by evaluating the compactness and separa-
tion of its clusters. The optimal partition P corresponds to
the one that have the best validity index. Subsequently, the
number of clusters contained in the obtained partition P is
equivalent to the optimal number of clusters c.
At each level, the clustering algorithm PFSOM relies on
fuzzy possibilistic learning process, in order to decrease the
influence of noisy data. In fact, real datasets are generally
characterized by the presence of noisy data and outliers,
which can directly influence the obtained data clusters. The
PFSOM algorithm integrates both of the concept of typi-
cality and membership values during the clustering process.
In fact, to classify a data point, a cluster centroid has to be
the closest one to the data point, and this what aims fuzzy
clustering by using a probabilistic constraint, i.e. member-
ship values (Bezdek et al 1984). In addition, for estimating
the centroids, the possibilistic constraint, i.e. typicality val-
ues, is used for mitigating the undesirable effect of outliers
(Krishnapuram and Keller 1993).
Generally speaking, to split a given dataset X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}
into c clusters, the PFSOM algorithm starts by initializing
the c cluster centres. Then, the prototypes of the latter are
adjusted during a learning process. This means that, the es-
timation of the cluster centres is achieved through an itera-
tive process. In each iteration, the prototype of each cluster
center c j is updated according to the membership and typi-
cality values of all data to that cluster. Where, the member-
ship value represents the degree to which a given data point
xi belongs to a cluster c j. Such value is measured accord-
ing to distances between xi to all cluster centres. However,
the typicality of a data point to a given cluster represents its
resemblance to the other data points belonging to the same
cluster, i.e. internal resemblance. The belonging of a data
point xi to a cluster c j, depends on the distance from xi to c j
relative to the distances of all data to that cluster (Pal et al
2005). The process of updating cluster centres as well as the
membership and typicality values is repeated until the sta-
bility condition is fulfilled or the predefined number of iter-
ations is achieved. Then, the clusters are obtained by assign-
ing each data to its nearest center. The clustering process of
the PFSOM algorithm is detailed in (Abidi and Ben Yahia
2013).
To sum up, the HM-PFSOM algorithm relies on two lev-
els of clustering process. On each level, the PFSOM algo-
rithm is used by adapting the distance measure. In fact, the
first level consists in splitting the original microdata X into
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c disjoint sub-microdata according to their quasi-identifiers,
i.e. X = {Xid1,Xid2, . . . ,Xidc}. Thus, the distance used to
compute typicality and membership values between a data
vector xi and a center c j is defined as follows:
dist(xi,c j) =
Q
∑
l=1
(xi [qih]− c j [qih])
Where Q refers to the number of quasi-identifiers, and x [qil ]is
the lth quasi-identifier of a given data vector x. In the previ-
ous example given in Table 4, Q is equal to 2, while xi[qi1]
and xi[qi2] correspond, respectively, to the ZIP code and Age
of the data vector xi. The same goes for the center c j.
On the other hand, the second level of clustering process is
used to study the distribution of the confidential attributes
within each sub-microdata Xid j. It is used to extract the cs
disjoint clusters of confidential attributes. So, the distance
used by the PFSOM algorithm is defined as:
dist(xi,c j) =
S
∑
p=1
(xi [sp]− c j [sp])
Where S refers to the number of confidential attributes, and
x [sp] is the pth sensitive attribute of a given data vector x.
In the example given in Table 4, S is equal to 1, while xi[s1]
corresponds to the salary attribute of the ith data vector.
4 Experimental results
This section aims to test the validity of the HM-PFSOM algo-
rithm for generating an anonymous microdata. We evaluate
the performance of our algorithm according to information
loss and disclosure risk on well real microdata.
In the following we present firstly the manipulated micro-
data and the measures used to evaluate our algorithm. Then,
we discuss the performance values of the HM-PFSOM algo-
rithm.
4.1 Evaluation data
To evaluate the performance of our proposed HM-PFSOM
algorithm with the main microaggregation methods, we con-
sider the three real-world microdata, used as benchmarks in
prior studies (Brand et al 2002), namely:
– CENSUS: This dataset was obtained on July 27, 2000
using the Data Extraction System of the U. S. Bureau of
the Census. The CENSUS dataset contains 1080 records
with 13 numeric attributes.
– EIA: This dataset was obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Authority. It consists of 4092 records with
15 attributes. Since the first two attributes are consid-
ered as direct identifiers of the records, we propose to
de-identify the dataset by removing the latter attributes.
Then, we have not taken into account the attribute Y EAR,
because the value of the latter attribute in the whole dataset
is equal to 96. We also eliminated the categorical at-
tribute STAT E, given that our proposed algorithm is de-
signed to handle continuous values. To sum up, we used
in our experiment only the 11 remaining attributes.
– TARRAGONA: This real dataset comprises the figures
from 834 companies in the area of Tarragona. This means
that, the dataset contains 834 records with 13 numeric
attributes.
Note that, in each dataset, the values of the attributes are
well apart, i.e. range in different domains. This can distort
the clustering results. Thus, we propose to normalize the ma-
nipulated datasets by Min-Max scaling technique. A value v
of an attribute is normalized to the value v′, by computing
the following formula:
v′ =
v−min(v)
max(v)−min(v)
Where min(v) and max(v) refer, respectively, to the mini-
mum and the maximum values of the attribute v.
4.2 Evaluation measures
Let X be an original dataset and X ′ its anonymous version.
The quality of the microaggregation methods has been eval-
uated from the perspectives of information loss and disclo-
sure risk, as follows:
– The information loss (IL) has been quantified by means
of the well-known measure which was exposed in (Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra 2004). The IL measure computes the
mean variation between the original and the perturbed
version of a record xi, given by the following formula :
IL =
n
∑
i=1
(
1
q
×
q
∑
j=1
|xi j− x′i j|√
2S j
)
(1)
where S j is the standard deviation of the jth variable in
the original data. Hence, the lower the information loss
is, the higher the utility of the anonymous data.
– The disclosure risk (DR) is quantified by Distance-Based
Record Linkage (DBRL). This method, introduced in (Pagli-
uca and Seri 1999), consists in computing distances be-
tween records in two datasets. The record linkage can
be used to find out to what extent anonymous records
could be re-identified. In general, for each record in the
original dataset X , the distance to every record in the
masked dataset X ′ is computed. Thereafter, the nearest
and the second nearest records in X ′ are extracted. A
record in the anonymous dataset X ′ is labeled as linked,
when the nearest record in the original dataset X matches
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its corresponding original record. A record in the anony-
mous microdata X ′ is designed as linked to 2nd nearest,
if the second nearest record in X turns out to be the cor-
responding original record. In all other cases, the records
are not linked.
4.3 Performance Analysis
The first part of the experimental evaluation consists in com-
paring the three main heuristics of microaggregation approach,
namely:
– The univariate microaggregation by individual sorting.
– The univariate microaggregation based on single axis
sorting criteria.
– The multivariate microaggregation based on diameter method,
i.e. MDAV.
The aim of this comparative study is to support our choice
of using the MDAV algorithm method in the fixed size par-
titioning process. Then, we discuss the performance of our
proposed hybrid microaggregation algorithm.
4.3.1 Performance Comparaison of univariate and
multivariate microaggregation methods
To assess the performance of the microaggregation meth-
ods, we used the R-Package sdcMicro (Templ et al 2015).
The latter package includes the popular methods of gener-
ating protected microdata. In the remainder of this section,
we choose to refer the univariate microaggregation heuris-
tic based on individual sorting criteria by ONEDIMS, while
the univariate microaggregation based on single axis sorting
criteria, by PCA.
We evaluate the performance of the three main microaggre-
gation heuristics on the real datasets cited above, by varying
the value of the parameter k and the number of the quasi-
identifiers. The information loss and disclosure risk mea-
sures of the different microaggregation heuristics are given
in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
By analyzing the results, we notice that the data utility and
the disclosure risk are inversely proportional, regardless the
microaggregation methods. We note that, for small values
of k, the information loss is at minimum score, while the
disclosure risk reaches its maximum scores. Otherwise, for
high values of k the information loss values are increased
and the anonymous dataset loses its utility, whereas the risk
of records re-identification is minimized. Such a mismatch
is confirmed by varying the privacy parameter k on EIA, Tar-
ragona and Census microdata. This contradiction can be ex-
plained by the fact that for small values of k, the records of
a given microdata are partitioned into a fixed size groups,
i.e. of size k, gathering similar records. Thus, each record
will be close to the centroid of the group to which it be-
longs to. Thus, replacing the quasi-identifiers of the original
records by their centroid, will produce a modified micro-
data fairly close to the original one. However, this anony-
mous microdata can not be effective to hide the identity of
original records, since an intruder may be able to link the
anonymous records with their nearest original ones. On the
other hand, by choosing a high value of k, the records of the
original microdata will be partitioned into a reduced number
of fixed size groups. Thereby, records with dissimilar quasi-
identifiers will be forced to be gathered in a same group. By
this way, the centroids of the fixed size groups will be mis-
calculated. Since the latter will be used to anonymize the
microdata, the information loss will be significant, which
can avoid the intruder to assume that the centroid assigned
to a record is always the nearest one.
By examining the performance of the microaggregation
heuristics, namely ONEDIMS, MDAV and PCA, we can
note that the multivariate microaggregation, i.e. the MDAV
method, is best suited than the univariate microaggregation,
i.e. ONEDIMS and PCA methods. The performance is mea-
sured in terms of handling the conflicting principles, i.e.
maintaining the data utility and avoiding the disclosure risk.
Indeed, regardless the value of the parameter k, the ONED-
IMS method results mostly lead to the lowest information
loss, but the highest disclosure risk values. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the univariate microaggregation by
individual sorting criteria applies the anonymization process
on each attribute. Thus, the anonymous multi-dimensional
records can violate the k-anonymity property. On the other
hand, the univariate microaggregation by PCA sorting crite-
ria method, studies at first the underlying multidimensional
correlation structure of the data vectors, to produce princi-
pal components. Then, the k-partition is formed by sorting
the training data vectors according to their principal compo-
nent. Thereafter, groups of successive k records are formed.
However, ranking the records by such approach mainly rely
on the correlation matrix. Such method can be very useful
with data that are very highly correlated. Indeed, the higher
the correlation the lower the information loss is. However,
not all data are highly correlated.
To sum up, we can consider that the multivariate microag-
gregation is best suited than the univariate microaggrega-
tion, in terms of balancing between the two conflicting is-
sues, namely data utility and privacy.
Several methods have been proposed to improve the perfor-
mance of the MDAV method. However, these improvements
have been addressed to decrease the information loss. As
mentioned above, we think that the optimal k-anonymous
microdata should not only maintain the information loss while
fulfilling the k-anonymity property, but also it should avoid
attribute disclosure. Thus, we have proposed the HM-PFSOM
algorithm aiming to achieve the optimal k-anonymous mi-
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Fig. 1: Comparing the DR of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on Census|Qid|=5 microdata
Fig. 2: Comparing the IL of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on Census|Qid|=5 microdata
Fig. 3: Comparing the DR of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on EIA|Qid|=7 microdata
Fig. 4: Comparing the IL of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on EIA|Qid|=7 microdata
Fig. 5: Comparing the DR of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on Tarragona|Qid|=5 microdata
Fig. 6: Comparing the IL of the main microaggregartion heuristics
on Tarragona|Qid|=5 microdata
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crodata, as we have defined. We should remember that our
proposed algorithm proceeds through an hybrid manner. It
consists in splitting the microdata into disjoint sub-microdata,
according to the similarity of the quasi-identifiers. Avoid-
ing thus the risk of gathering records with dissimilar quasi-
identifiers in a same group. Thereafter, the microaggregation
process can be applied independently on each sub-microdata.
4.3.2 Performance analysis of hybrid microaggregation
In the following, we propose to compare the performance of
the HM-PFSOM algorithm to those of the MDAV algorithm.
The performances are evaluated in terms of i) homogeneity
of sensitive attributes within the fixed size groups, by adapt-
ing the well-known Sum of Squared Errors; and ii) informa-
tion loss (IL).
Let P be the k-partition of the original microdata X . The ho-
mogeneity of sensitive attributes within each group of the
k-partition P is defined by :
SSEi =
ni
∑
j=1
s
∑
p=1
dist(x jp,cip),∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,g} (2)
Where SSEi measures the distances between the sensitive at-
tributes of the data belonging to a given group gi to its cen-
troid ci. The latter centroid is determined by
∑
ni
j=1∑
s
p=1 x jp
ni
.
Note that, the lower the value of SSEi, the more the sensi-
tive attributes within the ith group are close to their centroid,
which means that the sensitive attributes are similar. Since
our aim is to ensure a diversity of sensitive attributes within
the fixed size groups, thus high values of SSEi indicate that
the sensitive attributes of the ith group are well separated.
By analyzing the experimental results exposed in Tables 10
and 12, we can notice that, regardless the predefined privacy
parameter k, the HM-PFSOM algorithm is able to generate a
fixed size partition, where the minimal size of its groups is
proportional to the diversity of confidential attributes.
Suppose that the Census microdata is composed by a set
of 5 quasi-identifiers and a set of 8 sensitive attributes. To
anonymize the latter microdata, the HM-PFSOM algorithm
starts by splitting the original microdata into 3 disjoint sub-
microdata, according to the quasi-identifiers. We should men-
tion that we have used the PFSOM to extract the latter sub-
microdata.
Table 9 illustrates the 3 resulted sub-Census microdata,
which contain respectively 382, 376 and 322 data records.
On each sub-microdata, the HM-PFSOM algorithm studies
in a second phase the distribution of the confidential attributes.
For example, such as mentioned in Table 9, the data vec-
tors of the first sub-microdata of Census, i.e. sub-Census1,
are in turn partitioned into 3 classes of sensitive attributes.
While the second and the third sub-microdata contain re-
spectively 4 and 2 classes of confidential attributes. These
classes are then used to maintain the diversity within the ob-
tained partition. For example, by setting the parameter k to
the minimal value, i.e. k = 2, the obtained partition from
sub-Census1 is formed by 36 groups having a minimal size
equal to 8. Indeed, each group contain at least 2 records from
the three classes of confidential attributes. In fact, we note
that the minimal homogeneity of sensitive attributes SSEi
within the obtained groups is equal 8.41. While the mini-
mal SSEi values obtained by the MDAV algorithm is equal
to 0.9 ' 0. This would mean that the k-partitioning process
of the MDAV algorithm can group data within a same group
having a highly similar sensitive attributes. These data are
then exposed to the attribute attack. By increasing the value
of the parameter k, the HM-PFSOM algorithm is able to
maintain the diversity of sensitive attributes within the re-
sulted partition. Indeed, by setting the parameter k to 25 the
minimal SSEi value obtained by HM-PFSOM algorithm is
equal to 268.48. While that of the MDAV algorithm is equal
to 35.56. However, as expected, ensuring a diversity of con-
fidential attributes within the k-partition may affect the data
utility. In fact, the performance of the information loss ob-
tained by the MDAV algorithm are better than those of the
HM-PFSOM algorithm. Indeed, on the three sub-microdata
of Census microdata, by increasing the value of the privacy
parameter, the information loss obtained by HM-PFSOM al-
gorithm is increased from 22.75 to 40.31 for sub-Census1;
from 25.54 to 41.17 for sub-Census2; and from 17.90 to
40.87 for sub-Census3. Whereas, the information loss ob-
tained by the MDAV algorithm increases from 8.84 to 26.03
for sub-Census1, from 8.01 to 26.03 for sub-Census2 and
from 12.57 to 30.52 for sub-Census3. The detailed observa-
tions are given in Table 10.
These low performances in terms of data utility, is also true
for the sub-microdata tables of EIA microdata, which are
illustrated in Table 12 (page 14). This can be explained by
the fact that data with similar quasi-identifiers can be as-
signed to different groups, since they have a close sensitive
attributes. By contrast, this can avoid the attribute disclosure
risk.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new algorithm for multi-
variate microaggregation HM-PFSOM, based on fuzzy pos-
sibilistic clustering to generate the optimal partition. The lat-
ter is used to generate an anonymous microdata. Hence, the
HM-PFSOM algorithm covers three main goals, namely: i)
Preventing the identity disclosure risk by requiring that the
generated partition should fulfill the k-anonymity property;
ii) Preventing the attribute disclosure by ensuring the diver-
sity of confidential attributes within each fixed size group
of the generated partition; iii) Maintaining the data utility of
the anonymous microdata by increasing the homogeneity of
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Table 9: Distribution of the Census microdata
Microdata |sub−microdata| |Con f idential classes|
Census
|sub− census1|= 382
|C1|= 145
|C2|= 164
|C3|= 73
|sub− census2|= 376
|C1|= 50
|C2|= 121
|C3|=103
|C4|=103
|sub− census3|= 322 |C1|= 115|C2|= 207
Table 9 illustrates the 3 resulted sub-Census microdata, according to the 5 quasi-identifier attributes. Then, on each sub-Census microdata the distribution of confidential attributes
is studied. For example, the data vectors of the first sub-Census1 contains 3 classes of sensitive attributes. While the second and the third sub-microdata contain respectively 4 and
2 classes of sensitive attributes.
Table 10: Performance comparison on Census microdata
sub-microdata k
minimal # Groups min SSE j,1≤ j≤cs ILgroup size
HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV
sub-Census1
1 4 1 73 382 4.46 0.00 22.75 0.00
5 20 5 14 76 29.76 3.72 31.07 15.90
10 40 10 7 38 67.92 10.90 32.96 20.75
15 60 15 4 25 133.33 14.31 35.05 23.11
20 82 20 3 19 149.11 23.63 36.84 24.82
25 100 25 2 15 262.48 35.56 40.31 26.03
sub-Census2
1 7 1 50 370 4.52 0.00 25.54 0.00
5 35 5 10 75 27.26 2.66 31.24 13.98
10 70 10 5 37 63.07 8.21 36.22 18.69
15 105 15 3 25 104.27 12.44 37.05 20.64
20 140 20 2 18 184.53 16.29 41.17 22.63
sub-Census3
1 2 1 115 322 2.58 0.00 17.90 0.00
5 10 5 23 64 13.07 6.30 25.89 16.30
10 20 10 11 32 48.65 10.84 29.90 20.84
20 40 20 5 16 151.60 30.60 33.37 24.74
30 60 30 3 10 267.17 61.67 37.15 27.88
40 80 40 2 8 445.00 72.94 40.87 30.52
The performances are evaluated in terms of information loss (IL) and diversity of sensitive attributes within the fixed size groups (SSEi). The higher the value of SSEi, the more
the sensitive attributes within the ith group are dissimilar. Thus, the attribute disclosure risk is low.
Table 11: Splitting the EIA microdata into disjoint sub-microdata according to the 7 quasi-identifiers.
Microdata |sub−microdata| |Con f idential classes|
EIA
|sub−EIA1| = 464
|C1| = 238
|C2| = 78
|C3| = 148
|sub−EIA2| = 1195
|C1| = 828
|C2| = 233
|C3| = 134
|sub−EIA3| = 106 |C1| = 37|C2| = 69
|sub−EIA4| = 1191 |C1| = 273|C2| = 918
|sub−EIA5| = 1136 |C1| =259|C2| = 877
Table 11 illustrates the 5 resulted sub-EIA microdata, according to the 7 quasi-identifiers of the data records. The third column shows the distribution of confidential attributes
on each sub-EIA.
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Table 12: Performance comparison on EIA microdata
sub-microdata k
minimal # Groups min SSE j,1≤ j≤cs ILgroup size
HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV HM-PFSOM MDAV
sub-EIA1
1 5 1 78 464 4.89 0.00 21.21 0.00
5 25 5 15 92 34.61 4.60 29.09 12.97
10 50 10 7 46 88.69 8.74 33.44 17.51
20 100 20 3 23 275.50 15.85 41.78 21.51
30 150 30 2 15 457.89 42.64 46.45 23.84
sub-EIA2
1 8 1 134 1195 3.15 0.00 50.47 0.00
5 40 5 26 239 23.23 260 50.46 50.75
10 80 10 13 11 62.14 5.73 50.46 50.46
20 160 20 6 59 130.53 18.55 50.45 50.48
30 240 30 4 39 262.95 27.02 50.45 50.46
40 320 40 3 29 432.04 36.02 50.43 40.47
sub-EIA3
1 2 1 37 106 8.54 0.00 26.07 0.00
5 10 5 7 21 58.26 12.13 32.88 17.95
10 20 10 3 10 134.27 29.50 40.44 25.49
15 30 15 2 7 211.60 59.06 40.02 27.55
sub-EIA4
1 4 1 273 1191 1.08 0.00 15.48 0.00
5 20 5 54 238 7.33 0.10 18.52 5.18
10 40 10 27 119 13.91 0.55 20.94 7.47
30 120 30 9 39 72.60 2.68 25.25 11.08
50 200 50 5 23 146.44 4.65 30.57 13.13
100 400 100 2 11 474.85 10.74 46.75 17.22
sub-EIA5
1 4 1 259 1136 1.09 0.00 14.69 0.00
5 20 5 51 227 6.67 0.06 14.69 14.80
10 40 10 25 113 15.68 0.61 14.64 14.76
30 120 30 8 37 65.44 2.99 14.56 14.76
50 200 50 5 22 137.34 4.28 14.50 14.72
100 400 100 2 11 465.27 15.11 14.14 14.67
The performances are evaluated in terms of information loss (IL) and diversity of sensitive attributes within the fixed size groups (SSEi). The higher the value of SSEi is, the more
the sensitive attributes within the ith group are dissimilar.
the obtained partition.
The HM-PFSOM algorithm operates through an hybrid man-
ner. Its main idea consists in splitting the original dataset
into disjoint sub-datasets, in such a way that data within
the same sub-dataset must be similar to some extend, also
they should be dissimilar to those data in other sub-datasets.
Such process enables to avoid the refinement phases used
to fine tune the k-anonymous partition, since the partition-
ing process is performed only on similar data. Indeed, HM-
PFSOM applies the k-partitioning process independently on
each sub-dataset. On privacy side, the HM-PFSOM approach
proposes to study the distribution of confidential attributes
within each sub-dataset. Then, according to the latter distri-
bution, the privacy parameter k is determined, in such a way
to preserve the diversity of confidential attributes within the
anonymized microdata.
Our main interest in a future work lies in Privacy-Preserving
Data Sharing in the Smart City. In fact, smart city is a vision
proposed by many governments to integrate information and
communication technology (ICT) solutions into the critical
infrastructures of their cities and society with the goal of
improving the quality of life of their citizens (Curry et al
2016). Smart city applications comprise a number of diverse
areas, like smart card services for easy authentication and
payment on the go, smart resource management of water or
electricity, smart mobility applications that improve traffic
efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions (Novotny et al 2014).
The effectiveness of these and other smart city applications
heavily relies on data collection, interconnectivity, and per-
vasiveness. Smart city applications are increasingly relying
on personally identifiable data. In fact, people’s data are key
elements in order to design effective and smart policies and
services for citizens. Such type of data reflects the daily ac-
tivities of the people living, working, and visiting the city,
e.g. monitoring tourist foot traffic, or home energy usage,
or homelessness (Zoonen 2016). The more connected a city
the more it will generate a steady stream of data from and
about its citizens. However, connected smart city devices
raise concerns about individuals’ privacy, autonomy, free-
dom of choice, and potential discrimination by institutions.
Hybrid Microaggregation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining 15
Thus, privacy is a key concern in the facet of smart cities.
Thereby, develop a new framework for exploring people’s
specific privacy concerns in smart cities is considered as an
obvious prospect. The framework should hypothesize if and
how smart city technologies and urban big data produce pri-
vacy concerns among the people in these cities, such as in-
habitants, workers, visitors, and otherwise.
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